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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
MARY ELLEN DIENES*
During its last term the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided
about four dozen criminal cases involving a broad range of issues of
criminal law and procedure. The following treatment of those cases
is designed to set out the issues in a manner useful to those who prac-
tice before the Seventh Circuit.
ARREST
In two cases the Seventh Circuit treated the issue of whether law
enforcement agents had probable cause to stop a vehicle and effectu-
ate an arrest. In United States v. Robinson,' a Wisconsin sheriff re-
ceived an all-points bulletin that people in a specifically described ve-
hicle were suspected of attempting to pass a stolen postal money or-
der. The sheriff stopped an automobile of the same color and li-
cense number as indicated in the bulletin, saw a postal money order in
the car in plain view, and arrested the occupants of the car. In
United States v. Weatherford,' Indiana police officers knew that the
defendants there were convicted felons, knew that at least one of the
defendants had purchased firearms ammunition from a sporting goods
store, and had information that defendants were going hunting in
South Dakota. Police consequently stopped and arrested the defend-
ants in Illinois one mile west of the Illnois-Indiana border and
charged them with transporting firearms or ammunition in interstate
commerce. In each of these two cases, the, Seventh Circuit held
that there was probable cause to effectuate the arrest, as in each case
the police had information sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that
the defendants were committing or had committed a crime and that
evidence of the crime was in the vehicle.
The Court also upheld the arrest of defendant in United States
v. Lopez.8 Defendant contended that Government agents who arrested
* B.S., Loyola University (Chicago); J.D., Northwestern Law School; Graduate
Fellowship (Ford Foundation) in Criminal Law, Northwestern Law School, 1969-1970;
former Staff Attorney, Illinois Defender Project; former Staff Attorney, NLADA; pres-
ently Assistant State's Attorney, Cook County, Illinois.
1. 470 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1972).
2. 471 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1972).
3. 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1973).
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him did not comply with a statutory requirement4 that, prior to en-
tering a dwelling, officers must make (1) an announcement of their
authority to make the arrest, and (2) an announcement of their pur-
pose to make an arrest. The agents had staked out defendant's
hotel room and, from an adjoining room, overheard conversations in-
dicating that narcotics were in defendant's room. The agents heard
defendant say to someone else in the room, "Let's get out of here."
When defendant opened the hotel room door, the agents entered the
room and arrested him and the other occupants. The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that, because defendant opened the door on
his way out of the room, the arresting agents who then entered the
opened door were not required to announce their authority or pur-
pose.
In United States v. Marlin,5 the Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded defendants' theft convictions after holding that the arrest of
defendants was unlawful. Where the agents who arrested defend-
ants had no knowledge at the time of the arrest that a specific crime
had occurred or that defendants had been at the crime site, there was
no probable cause to arrest them.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The Court of Appeals decided two cases involving consent to
search. In United States v. Hayward,6 defendant's conviction for
knowingly possessing goods stolen from interstate commerce was af-
firmed. On appeal he alleged that the police officer who searched
his premises and seized evidence, did so without a search warrant and
without defendant's consent. After informing defendant he had no
search warrant, the officer again asked defendant whether he could
search defendant's premises. Defendant responded, "Okay, I can't
stop you." The Court of Appeals held that such language clearly indi-
cated consent free from coercion. And in United States v. Stone,
7
the Court of Appeals, affirming defendant's robbery conviction, up-
held a search of defendant's home that was conducted by F.B.I. agents
4. Title 18, U.S.C.A. § 3109 (1971).
§ 3109. Breaking doors or windows for entry or exit
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a
house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search war-
rant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or
when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of
the warrant.
5. 471 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1972).
6. 471 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1972).
7. 471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972).
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after defendant's wife voluntarily consented to the search. In a strong
dissenting opinion, however, Chief Judge Swygert challenged the blan-
ket rule cited by the majority, that where two persons have equal rights
to the occupation of premises, either may give consent to a search of
the premises. 8  The Chief Judge would qualify the rule to permit only
reasonable searches, considering all attendant circumstances; and he
would challenge the search here, even though defendant's wife volun-
tarily consented to it, where the search was conducted only minutes
after defendant was arrested on the premises and removed by Gov-
ernment agents.
In United States v. Gamble,9 the Court of Appeals ruled on the
application of Chimel v. California"° with respect to the scope of
the warrantless search of defendant's residence at the time of his ar-
rest by police at 12:30 A.M. Reversing defendant's conviction of pos-
session of an unregistered firearm, the Court held that the police
were not justified in conducting a "protective sweep" by searching the
entire house simply because defendant had socalled "violent propen-
sities" and because police heard "rustling noises" inside the residence
after they announced their office and purpose.
The Court of Appeals upheld a search and affirmed a conviction
for possession of unregistered firearms in United States v. Unger."
The search there was conducted pursuant to a warrant based on a com-
plaint alleging that a private citizen (with Army weapons experience)
who was in the building subsequently searched, observed weapons
stored in a locker, and reported and described the weapons to police.
The Court held that the complaint was factually sufficient to form
a probable cause basis for issuance of the warrant, and that the com-
plaint was sufficient despite the omission of an allegation of reliability
of the informant, as the informant was a private citizen.
In the two cases dealing with the arrest of vehicle occupants,
supra, the Court upheld the search of the vehicles. In both United
States v. Weatherford and United States v. Robinson, the Court relied
on Coolidge v. New Hampshire'2 which recognized the rule that contra-
8. Citing United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
347 U.S. 935 (1954).
9. 473 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1973).
10. 393 U.S. 958 (1968), limiting the scope of a warrantless search incident to
arrest to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.
11. 469 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1972).
12. 403 U.S. 443, 458 (1971). The search of an automobile in Coolidge was
struck down as illegal, as petitioner there was arrested in his home while the unoccu-
pied auto was parked outside and in no danger of being moved.
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band illegally transported in a vehicle may be searched for without a
warrant, where the searching officer has probable cause for believ-
ing that the vehicle contains contraband that is being transported ie-
gaily.
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION; MIRANDA
In United States v. Durham,1" the Court of Appeals was divided
on the question of whether defendant's 1961 confession was properly
admitted at trial. The confession was obtained by an-F.B.I. agent in
defendant's jail cell after defendant's preliminary hearing and outside
the presence of defendant's counsel. The interrogation occurred prior
to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona";
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held here that a retrospec-
tive application of Massiah v. United States'5 was controlling in this
case. Chief Judge Swygert was of the opinion that Massiah, involving
a post-indictment statement, was nevertheless applicable to the post-
arrest/preliminary hearing statement here, and that defendant should
receive a new trial. Judge Pell believed that the proper remedy would
be not a new trial, but a hearing to determine whether the statement
was given voluntarily (i.e., whether defendant understandingly waived
the presence of his counsel); and that if the hearing determined the
confession was voluntary, defendant's conviction should stand. Judge
Castle was of the opinion that Massiah was not controlling here be-
cause defendant knowingly waived the right to have his counsel present
at the interview when he gave his statement. Judge Castle also
stated that defendant's confession, measured by the 1961 pre-Miranda
standard,' did not totally hinge on the fact that counsel was not
present, as lack of representation by counsel under such standard
would go only to the weight to be given other evidence of actual
coercion.
In several cases the Seventh Circuit considered the ramifica-
13. 475 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1973).
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966), holding that statements taken from an accused during
custodial police interrogation in absence of procedural requirements are inadmissible.
15. 377 U.S. 201 (1964), holding that Massiah had been denied his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel by the introduction at his trial of an inculpatory statement elicited
from him by Government agents after his indictment and in the absence of his tcounsel.
The Seventh Circuit here held that retroactive application of Massiah is required by
McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
16. Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446 (1971) held that the crucial determination
controlling the admissibility of a pre-Miranda confession is whether defendant's will
had been overborne to the extent that his confession was not a voluntary act, 400
U.S. at 453.
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tions of Miranda v. Arizona in relation to Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.
In United States v. Lomprez,17 the Court affirmed defendants'
robbery convictions. One of the defendants, approached at his home
by F.B.I. agents, was fully advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona; he then gave an exculpatory statement. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the statement was voluntary and admissible into evi-
dence where elicited after the Miranda warnings had been given, re-
gardless of whether or not defendant was in custody at the time. Fur-
ther, the exculpatory statement was admissible into evidence even
though defendant did not testify, as it had independent probative
value as evidence of a consciousness of guilt.
United States v. Krilich,18 involved the admission into evidence
of a conversation between defendant and I.R.S. Special Agents. The
Court of Appeals held that where defendant was given the warnings
prescribed by Miranda, he was sufficiently alerted that he might be
suspected of violating criminal statutes. Consequently there was no
requirement to suppress defendant's conversation with the Special
Agents.
The Court of Appeals ruled on cases involving the application
of its earlier decision in United States v. Dickerson19 to seizure of evi-
dence. In Dickerson the Court had held that once a taxpayer is un-
der criminal investigation, he must be warned of his constitutional
rights as prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona before any further interro-
gation can take place. In United States v. Habig,2" the Court refused
to apply the Dickerson rule to corporate records and leads obtained
by I.R.S. agents for use as evidence in a criminal prosecution. The
Court held that even though a corporate officer is a prospective
criminal defendant, he is not entitled to Miranda warnings when re-
quested to produce corporate records. Defendant in United States v.
Sicilia,2' also attempted to rely on the Dickerson rule. Four F.B.I.
agents went to Sicilia's place of business pursuant to an informant's
tip, found stolen property, and interrogated Sicilia on the premises
about the property. The Court of Appeals noted that the underlying
rationale for the Dickerson rule was limited to the facts in that case:
that when a taxpayer is being investigated by Internal Revenue agents,
17. 472 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1972).
18. 470 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1972).
19. 413 F.2d 1111 (7thCir. 1969).
20. 474 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973).
21. 475 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1973).
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he should be advised, by way of Miranda warnings, when the nature of
the investigation shifts from a general type to one criminal in nature.
But in Sicilia, the presence of F.B.I. agents on defendant's property in
no way misled defendant from the fact that the agents' investigation
was of criminal nature. The Court thus refused to apply Dickerson
to the non-custody situation of Sicilia.
In both Habig and Sicilia, as well as in United States v. Hay-
ward,22 the Court of Appeals reiterated its rule articulated in United
States v. Young,2 3 that the warnings required by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments under Miranda are not a sine qua non to a valid consen-
sual search under the Fourth Amendment. In Young, after defendant
had invited police into his home to "look around," they had found and
seized incriminating evidence in his personal possession. The Court
of Appeals held that no Miranda warnings were required by the Fourth
Amendment in advance of the search.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Court of Appeals considered the question of test of indi-
gency with respect to appointing counsel, in United States v. Kelly.2"
In refusing to appoint counsel for defendant, the trial judge found that
defendant's motion for appointed counsel was not made in good faith,
but was made for purposes of delay. The Court of Appeals found
no error in refusal to appoint counsel, noting that the proper test of
eligibility was defendant's financial inability. In view of the judge's
credibility finding, the Court of Appeals held there was substantial
evidence to support the trial judge's inference that defendant was not
financially unable- to obtain an attorney. In view of the able manner
in which defendant (an attorney) -defended himself at trial, the
Court of Appeals found that defendant was not prejudiced by denial
of appointed counsel, nor denied a fair trial.
Two cases concerned the right to Counsel and identification pro-
cedures. In United States v. Pigg,25 the Court of Appeals held it
was not error to admit identification testimony in evidence where the
witness observed defendant at an .identification procedure at which
counsel was not present, because, the witness's identification of defend-
ant was based on an independent source that was shown to be reli-
22. 471 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1972).
23. 471 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1972).
24. 467 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1972).
25. 471 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1973).
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able. Defendant also contended that a photographic identification
procedure was impermissibly suggestive; but the Court of Appeals re-
jected this argument on the basis that, on cross-examination of the
eyewitness, defense counsel elicited testimony showing only that there
was no impropriety in the photographic identification procedure.
United States v. Smith,2 6 involved a. voice identification of defendant
from tapes of defendant's voice. Neither defendant nor his counsel
was present at the identification procedure. The Court of Appeals re-
fused to apply the counsel requirement of Gilbert v. California2 7 and
Wade v. United States2 8 to a recorded Voice identification procedure
under the facts in this case, where the identification of defendant as the
one who made the recordings was never in issue. Further, any ac-
tual identification of the voice as that of defendant took place prior
to indictment 29 and independent of the recorded voice identification
procedure objected to.
SUFFICIENCY OF INDICTMENT
The test of sufficiency is whether the indictment sufficiently ap-
prised defendant of the nature of the offense(s) with which he was
charged and makes an adequate record so that, if necessary, he could
plead the conviction(s) in bar of future prosecution(s) for the same
offense(s).3 ° In United States v. Grizaffi,3' an indictment charging
conspiracy to misapply funds of federally insured savings and loan as-
sociation was held to sufficiently allege the essential facts constituting
the offense charged. In United States v. Green,32 the Court of Appeals
ruled as sufficient an indictment charging defendant with making a false
statement to a firearms dealer with respect to a material fact concerning
the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm to him. The indictment did not
allege that defendant had acquired a firearm which had been shipped
in interstate or foreign commerce. This omission was not a fatal defect,
26. 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972).
27. 388 U.S. 263 (1967), applying to the states the requirement of presence of
counsel at post-indictment pre-trial lineups.
28. 388 U.S. 218 (1967), holding that a post-indictment lineup was a critical
stage of the criminal proceedings at which the presence of counsel was required.
29. In Kirby y. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the United States Supreme Court
refused to apply the Wade-Gilbert rule to a pre-indictment case where the identification
occurred before the initiation of adversary judicial criminal procedures.
30. United States v. Henderson, 471 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1972) (indictment
charging embezzlement and interstate transportation of stolen bond held sufficient.).
31. 471 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1972).
•32. 471 F.2d 775 (7thCir. 1972).
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because in a prosecution for this charge the Government need not al-
lege nor prove at trial that the firearm in question passed through
interstate commerce.
DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE BY PROSECUTION
In United States v. Crovedi,3 3 defendants appealed from their
convictions of theft and conspiracy to steal, on the ground that the
trial court refused to require the prosecution to disclose the present
names, addresses and employment of the key Government witnesses
(admitted participants in the offenses who had earlier pleaded guilty).
The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
determination that the witnesses had reason to fear that disclosure of
their present identities would endanger themselves and their families.
The Court thus held that the rule of Smith v. Illinois34 is not an
absolute and is subject to discretionary exception where the personal
safety of the witness would be endangered.
Defendant in United States v. Hauff,36 argued that delay by the
prosecution in disclosing to defendant a handwriting comparison re-
port until its use at trial, constituted error where defendant had filed a
pretrial discovery motion. The report was introduced when a Govern-
ment handwriting expert was called to rebut the testimony of a de-
fense expert who had testified that one of two disputed signatures was
not that of defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's
conviction and held that error in introducing the report, if any, was
harmless, where the Government witness testified only that the evi-
dence as to the author of the signatures was inconclusive.
In United States v. Lomprez,3 6 defendant's contended that the
prosecution suppressed evidence favorable to the defense in violation of
Brady v. Maryland,"7 in that the Government failed to disclose
statements of two witnesses who could not positively identify the de-
fendants. In rejecting this contention and affirming the convictions,
33. 467 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1972).
34. 390 U.S. 129 (1968), holding that petitioner was deprived of his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to confront the witness against him, when he was de-
nied the right to ask the principal prosecution witness either his correct name or his
address.
35. 473 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1973).
36. 472 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1972).
37. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The United States Supreme Court stated that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request vio-
lates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment ir-
respective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
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the Court of Appeals noted that all eyewitnesses testified at trial, two
of them making positive in-court identifications of defendants and that
the Government had furnished the defense with the name and address
of an alibi witness interviewed by the Government whose testimony
was favorable to the defense.
United States v. Stone,88 also involved the contention by defend-
ant of a violation of Brady v. Maryland. Defendant based his con-
tention on the fact that the prosecution had pretrial knowledge that
two of the bank employees could not identify defendant as the bank
robber. Noting that the Government produced both witnesses at trial,
at which time they testified they could not identify defendant, the Court
of Appeals held that defendant was not prejudiced by the Govern-
ment's failure to disclose the testimony to defendant at an earlier time.
In United States v. Kaplan,89 defendant contended that the Gov-
ernment failed to disclose that a fact, critical for impeachment pur-
poses, was misrepresented by a Government witness. The witness
testified that he had received no promise of leniency from the Govern-
ment in testifying against defendant on one of five counts of mail fraud
for which defendant was convicted. (The witness was himself a de-
fendant in the case and was serving a prison sentence on another
charge at the time of his testimony.) Noting that this came within the
rule of Napue v. Illinois,4" which also involved failure of a prosecu-
tor to contradict the false testimony of a prosecution witness that he
had not been promised leniency, the Court of Appeals here reversed
the mail fraud conviction that had been tainted by the Government
witness's testimony. But the Court of Appeals affirmed the other con-
victions, holding that they were not tainted by the testimony.
In United States v. Krilich,41 defendant's convictions of income
tax offenses were affirmed, the Court of Appeals rejecting defend-
ant's assignment of error as to denial of his request for documentary
production. The grand jury testimony of a Government witness was
not disclosed to defendant because the trial judge, after inspecting the
testimony, concluded that it did not relate to the subject matter of the
witness's trial testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
38. 471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972).
39. 470 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972).
40. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Though the false testimony of the state's key witness
concerning a promise of leniency related only to his credibility, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the failure of the prosecutor to correct what he knew
was false testimony invalidated the trial.
41. 470 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1972).
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judge's ruling. Other documents that defendant sought to be dis-
closed were properly withheld because they were not statements within
the meaning of Rule 16(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.
SEVERANCE
Defendants in United States v. Lomprez,42 claimed that the
district court erred in refusing to grant a severance. Defendants relied
on Bruton v. United States43 in arguing that a false exculpatory state-
ment of one co-defendant prejudiced another co-defendant. In reject-
ing this contention, the Court of Appeals noted that, unlike Bruton,
this case did not charge a conspiracy between the defendants; and the
statement related only to the co-defendant's activities at the time in
question and could not have prejudiced defendant.
In United States v. Henderson,44 defendant contended that fail-
ure of the trial court to grant severance from her co-defendant father
prevented her from calling him as a witness on her behalf. The
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that the mere possibil-
ity he might have testified on her behalf did not establish prejudice by
failure to sever. Further, separate trials would not have guaranteed to
defendant that her father would waive his right against self-incrimina-
tion to testify at her trial. A similar claim was presented in United
States v. Stevison,45 where defendant alleged it was error to deny her
motion to sever her trial from that of her daughter. Defendant claimed
that her defense (that her daughter coerced her into performing crimi-
nal acts by threatening suicide if she did not do so) was prejudiced be-
cause her daughter's defense was insanity. The Court of Appeals
found no error in the denial of the motion for severance as the de-
fenses did not necessarily conflict and that, in fact, testimony concern-
ing the daughter's eccentric conduct tended to aid rather than to op-
pose defendant's coercion defense.
SPEEDY TRIAL
In United States v. DeTienne,4 6 defendants DeTienne and Askins
were convicted of having attempted to rob a bank on September 25,
42. 472 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1972).
43. 391 U.S. 123 (1968), protecting a defendant's right to confront witnesses in
situations involving trial use of a co-defendant's statement incriminating the defendant.
44. 471 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1972).
45. 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1972).
46. 468 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1972).
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1968. They were indicted on December 5, 1969; their joint trial
commenced on July 13, 1971, and the jury returned guilty verdicts two
days after that. Defendants contended on appeal that they were
denied their right to speedy trial in that the delay between the date of
the offense (September 25, 1968) and the date of trial (July 13,
1971) was excessive. Noting that defendants were arrested by state
and federal officers days after the bank robbery attempt for other
offenses unrelated to the federal attempted bank robbery charge, the
Court of Appeals noted that the arrests on unrelated charges did not
trigger the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protection as to prosecu-
tions for any other chargeable offenses. The Court held that the
date on which defendants became accused for the purpose of com-
puting pretrial delay was the date of indictment-December 5, 1969
-and that defendants failed to show how the pre-indictment delay
prejudiced their rights to a fair trial. As to post-indictment pretrial
delay, the Court of Appeals referred to the factors delineated by the
United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo47 to be considered
in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a
'speedy trial. The factors are: length of delay, reason for the delay,
defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial, and prejudice to de-
fendant. As to defendant Askins, the Court found that he waived
his right to speedy trial after being paroled from a state prison by flee-
ing the jurisdiction prior to trial on the charge at bar. He was arrested
by Government agents in Florida on the instant charge six months
before trial, but asserted denial of his right to speedy trial only the
day before trial. Defendant DeTienne was in custody the entire nine-
teen months between indictment and trial. But the Court of Ap-
peals found no denial of right to speedy trial where delay in bringing
him to trial did not result in prejudice and where he did not demand
speedy trial until his counsel moved to dismiss the indictment about
ten days before trial. The convictions of both men were affirmed.
In United States v. White,4 8 defendant's conviction of selling
heroin was affirmed. The offense was committed in March, 1970;
defendant was arrested in April, 1971; a potential defense witness
died one week after his arrest; he was indicted in June, 1971. He as-
serts that he was prejudiced by the 15-month delay between the crime
47. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction of the petitioner who was brought to trial five years after indictment and after
16 continuances were granted to the prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the
delay did not constitute reversible error because the record indicated the petitioner
did not want a speedy trial and because the delay did not prejudice him.
48. 470 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972).
CHICAGO-KENT LA4W REVIEW
and indictment, during which period a defense witness died. The
Court of Appeals rejected this claim because there was no showing
as to how defendant was prejudiced by the delay and-the death of the
witness; and because the Sixth Amendment protection of the right
to speedy trial is limited to post-arrest situations.49
JURY SELECTION
The Court of Appeals affirmed convictions of willful damage
to Government property in Chase v. United States,5" after finding no
basis in the record for defendants' contention that there was systematic
and intentional discrimination against young adults in either the grand
jury or the petit jury. The Court also held that the trial judge did not
abuse his broad discretion in the conduct of the voir dire by failing to
ask the prospective jurors about their reactions to courtroom security
procedures (specifically, the search of persons entering the court-
room); and that if his failure to conduct such inquiry was error, it was
harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. But in
United States v. Lewin and United States v. Connon,51 the Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded convictions for conspiring to pay and
offer to pay persons for registering to vote. The trial judge who con-
ducted the examination of prospective jurors committed reversible er-
ror in failing to ask the veniremen about contributions to or employ-
ment by certain associations that had conducted voter registration in-
vestigations and that employed the chief prosecution witnesses. The
Court of Appeals held that the right of defendants to be tried by an
impartial jury included the right to an examination of prospective
jurors designed to ascertain possible prejudices of the veniremen.
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
In United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin,52 four juveniles filed
a habeas corpus petition seeking release from a certain institution. The
district court denied the relief, but ordered the juveniles transferred
to another institution. Respondent urged on appeal that a new trial
be ordered because of alleged flagrant misconduct by the district court
49. The Court relied on United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), wherein
the United States Supreme Court declared that the right to speedy trial under the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and rule 48(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure is limited to post-arrest situations.
50. 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972).
51. 467 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1972).
52. 472 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1973).
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judge. The Court of Appeals rejected respondent's claim that the trial
judge prejudged the merits of the case, as the record and the judge's
ruling belied this assertion. However, the Court of Appeals agreed
with respondent that the district court judge assumed the role of advo-
cate and exhibited unprovoked hostility toward counsel. As the pro-
priety of the relief granted by the trial judge was not in question on
appeal, the Court of Appeals declined to order a new trial. But the
Court held that if any further proceedings would become necessary in
the case, they should be conducted by a different judge.
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
The Court of Appeals decided two cases involving the relevancy
of evidence. In United States v. Malasanos,53 defendant was convicted
of attempted bank robbery. He contended on appeal that it was error
to have admitted into evidence the fact that he succeeded in robbing
the bank, because it was not relevant to the charge of attempt and
thus so prejudicial as to require reversal. In affirming his conviction,
the Court applied the rule that it is proper to admit into evidence a
crime other than the one charged in the indictment where the other
crime explains or helps to establish an element of the crime charged.
The Court also noted that the success of defendant in robbing the
bank was no defense to the attempt charge. In United States v. Mar-
lin, 4 defendants were convicted of breaking the seals of a railway car
and stealing cases of beer. They claimed that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence a bottle of detection fluid painted on railway
car handles, because the bottle bore a label suggesting its use to
trap "sneak thieves." The Court of Appeals held that there was suffi-
cient probative value to justify the admissibility of the bottle, noting
that a trial judge has wide latitude in ruling on relevancy and materi-
ality.
Defendant's convictions of fraud by interstate wire communica-
tion were affirmed in United States v. Zweig.55 Defendant objected to
the introduction into evidence of certain telephone conversations in
the absence of authentification of the calls and evidence identifying de-
fendant as one of the parties. The Court of Appeals rejected this
claim, noting that the Government did subsequently prove a suffi-
cient connection between the calls and the defendant and that the ulti-
mate question of authenticity was for the jury to decide.
53. 472 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1973).
54. 471 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1972).
55. 467 F.2d 1217 (1972).
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In United States v. Powers,56 defendant's mail fraud conviction
was affirmed. Defendant's attorney had attempted at trial to ask a
Government witness whether a check allegedly received by defendant
as part of the mail fraud scheme had actually been attributed as income
to a co-defendant in a successful prosecution of the co-defendant for
tax evasion. The Government's objection to the question was sus-
tained. On appeal defendant contended that evidence of the claimed
governmental inconsistent position about the check should have gone
before the jury. The Court of Appeals held, however, that the defense's
cross-examination of the witness on that point was objectionable be-
cause of its duplicitous nature and was immaterial to the issue of
whether the prosecution was estopped from prosecuting defendant
for receiving the same item of income.
Defendant's bank robbery conviction was affirmed in United
States v. Stone.57  The Court of Appeals held that introduction of a
gun taken from defendant's home at the time of his arrest did not vio-
late his right to a fair trial under the due process clause, even though
the gun was not one used in the bank robbery. Noting that the trial
judge has wide discretion in the admission of collateral evidence, the
Court held that in this case the gun had probative value in substantiat-
ing the statements of key Government witnesses who testified that de-
fendant had threatened them with a pistol.58
In United States v. Grizaffi,5 9 defendants were convicted, inter
alia, of conspiracy to make false entries in books and records with in-
tent to deceive the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
and others. The Court of Appeals held that it is a proper exercise of
discretion for a court to exclude expert testimony concerning matters
clearly within the realm of the jury's comprehension; and that in this
case the testimony of an accounting expert was properly excluded
when it became evident that the expert would do no more than make
basic computations of arithmetic with figures supplied to him by coun-
sel.
In United States v. Stevison, 0 defendant was convicted of misap-
plying funds in a federally insured bank. The Court of Appeals held
56. 467 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972).
57. 471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972).
58. The Court of Appeals cited Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), wherein
the United States Supreme Court held that the introduction of a 16-gauge shotgun into
evidence in a murder trial in which the victim had been killed by a 12-gauge shot-
gun, was permissible under the due process clause.
59. 471 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1972).
60. 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1972).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
that the district court did not err in permitting a witness to testify that
he called defendant concerning the worth of a check drawn by defend-
ant's daughter, and that defendant told him the check would be hon-
ored. The Court held that the testimony was properly admitted as
bearing on intent.
In United States v. Henderson,6 defendant objected to the ad-
mission into evidence of various exhibits under the Federal Business
Records Act. 2 In each case in which a witness was unable to account
for any mark on an exhibit, the trial court had diligently insisted that
the unidentified marks be masked, that the exhibit be photocopied,
and that only the expurgated photocopy be shown to the jury. The
Court of Appeals held that this was a correct application by the dis-
trict court of the Federal Business Records Act.
In two cases the Court of Appeals dealt with the admission of
character evidence. In United States v. Lewin and United States v.
Connon,63 defendants' convictions were reversed and remanded. The
Court of Appeals held that the district court's treatment of defense
61. 471 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1972).
62. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (1971).
§ 1732. Record made in regular course of business; photographic copies
(a) In any court of the United States and in any court established by
Act of Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a
book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction,
occurrence, or event, if made in regular course of any business, and if it was
the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at
the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable
time thereafter.
All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including
lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect
its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility.
The term "business," as used in this section, includes business, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind.
(b) If any business, institution, member of a profession or calling, or
any department or agency of government, in the regular course of business or
activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, rep-
resentation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence, or
event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of the same
to be recorded, copied, or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, micro-
film, micro-card, miniature photographic, or other process which accurately
reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the
original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preserva-
tion is required by law. Such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is
as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative
proceeding whether the original is in existence or not and an enlargement or
facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the original
reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of
court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement, or facsimile
does not preclude admission of the original. This subsection shall not be
construed to exclude from evidence any document or copy thereof which is
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62
Stat. 945; Aug. 28, 1951, c. 351, §§ 1, 3, 65 Stat. 206; Aug. 30, 1961, Pub.
L. 87-183, 75 Stat. 413.
63. 467 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1972).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
counsel's efforts to lay a foundation for character evidence was undully
restrictive. An accused has the right to offer evidence of his good
character to show he was unlikely to have acted in the manner and
with the intent charged in the indictment. In United States v. Barn-
bulas,6" defense counsel asked each of five reputation witnesses whether
he knew about defendant's reputation in the community for honesty,
integrity and truthfulness; each replied that he did and that defendant's
reputation was very good. Defense counsel was precluded from asking
all the witnesses, and received no answer from any, as to whether each
witness would believe defendant on oath. The Court of Appeals held
that, though the question was precluded, defendant was not preju-
diced by its exclusion when considering the testimony concerning his
reputation in the community that was allowed into evidence. Any
error in precluding the question was therefore harmless.
Three cases on impeachment evidence were considered by the
Court of Appeals. In United States v. Jansen,6 5 affirming defendant's
conviction, the Court stated the rule that a defendant's general credi-
bility as a witness can be impeached only by a felony conviction. At
trial defense counsel asked defendant on direct examination whether
he had ever been convicted of a crime, defendant replied that he had
not. On cross-examination the prosecutor was allowed to question
defendant concerning a prior conviction for a misdemeanor. The
Court of Appeals said that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in not striking the exchange between defendant and defense coun-
sel, and in permitting the impeachment of defendant by his prior mis-
demeanor conviction. In United States v. Crovedi,66 one of the defend-
ants assigned error in that the district court judge refused to allow
him to impeach an identification witness by reading to the jury the
record of the witness's attempts at identification at defendant's first
trial. The Court of Appeals found no error because there was no real
inconsistency between the witness's inability to identify defendant as
demonstrated in the first trial and his testimony in the second trial that
he did not know whether the guilty person was in the courtroom or not.
The Court noted that prior statements may be used to impeach the
credibility of a witness only if the judge is satisfied that the prior
statements are in fact inconsistent. In United States v. Kaplan,67 de-
fendant claimed that the trial judge erred in permitting impeachment
64. 471 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1972).
65. 475 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1973).
66. 467 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1972).
67. 470 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972).
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of a defense character witness through questions dealing with a previ-
ous suspension of the defendant by the county medical association.
The Court of Appeals rejected the claim, holding that the prejudicial
effect of the cross-examination was neutralized by the testimony of
the same witness in response to the defense counsel's questions on redi-
rect examination. The witness stated that defendant had since been
reinstated by the county medical association.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
When the Court of Appeals is confronted with the claim that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction, the Court must review
the evidence presented to the factfinder and view such evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Smith, 8
United States v. Zweig, 9 United States v. Grizaffi. 71 Consequently,
the Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient to sustain defend-
ant's convictions of embezzlement and interstate transportation of a
stolen bond in United States v. Henderson.71  In United States v.
Krilich,72 defendant's convictions of income tax offenses were affirmed
after the Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported the findings
that the defendant willfully overstated the basis of land that he sold.
And in United States v. Robinson,73 the Court held that the evidence
clearly established a conspiracy where the Government showed that
defendant and his pals came to a mutual understanding to accomplish
unlawful acts (retaining and converting stolen postal money orders);
no formal agreement was required.
In United States v. Kelly," defendant's conviction of using the
mails to defraud by unauthorized use of a credit card belonging to an-
other was affirmed. The Court of Appeals noted that the Government
was required to prove the essential allegation that part of the defend-
ant's fraudulent scheme was to cause the airlines from which he pur-
chased tickets with the credit card to mail transportation receipts to
their accounting offices and to cause those offices to mail the receipts
to the credit card company (the air travel card had been issued by
United Airlines). The Court concluded, however, that defendant
must have anticipated that his fraudulent scheme necessarily in-
68. 467 F.2d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1972).
69. 467 F.2d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1972).
70. 471 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1972).
71. 471 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1972).
72. 470 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1972).
73. 470 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1972).
74. 467 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1972).
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volved the mailing by the airlines defrauded into extending credit to
the ultimate victim, United. Noting that recent cases75 have ex-
panded on the notion that credit card schemes to defraud involve use of
the mails, the Court here held that there was ample evidence that use
of the mails was an integral part of defendant's fraudulent credit card
scheme.
In United States v. Maenza,76 defendant was convicted of mak-
ing false statements for the purpose of obtaining FHA loan insurance.
The Court of Appeals held that the statute defendant was convicted of
violating" did not require the Government to show that defendant
knew that the loan would be offered to the FHA for insurance; but
that it was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly made false
statements with the intent that the loan he sought would be submitted
to the FHA for some purpose.
In United States v. Stevison,78 defendant's conviction of misapply-
ing funds in a federally insured bank was affirmed. The Court of Ap-
peals stated that although there was no direct evidence that defendant
specifically intended to defraud the bank, there was uncontroverted
evidence that she received worthless checks, authorized their pay-
ment, failed to return the checks after promising a bank official she
would do so, and pursuaded the bank board to delay action by prom-
ising restoration when she knew she would be financially unable to do
so. The Court of Appeals concluded the jury could infer from such
evidence that the essential element of intent or "reckless disregard" of
the bank's interest was proven. Stevison's co-defendant/daughter
75. Citing United States v. Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319 (2nd Cir. 1970); United
States v. Chason, 451 F.2d 301 (2nd Cir. 1971); United States v. Kelem, 416 F.2d 346,
350 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 952.
76. 475 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1973).
77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1010 (1971).
§ 1010. Department of Housing and Urban Development and Federal Hous-
ing Administration transactions.-Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining any
loan or advance of credit from any person, partnership, association, or cor-
poration with the intent that such loan or advance of credit shall be offered to
or accepted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for in-
surance, or for the purpose of obtaining any extension or renewal of any loan,
advance of credit, or mortgage insured by such Department, or the acceptance,
release, or substitution of any security on such a loan, advance of credit, or
for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of such Department,
makes, passes, utters, or publishes any statement, knowing the same to be
false, or alters, forges, or counterfeits any instrument, paper, or document, or
utters, publishes, or passes as true any instrument, paper, or document, know-
ing it to have been altered, forged, or counterfeited, or willfully overvalues
any security, asset, or income, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned not more than two years, or both. (June 25, 1948, c. 645, § 1,
62 Stat. 751; May 25, 1967, P.L. 90-19, § 24(c), 81 Stat. 28.)
78. 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1972).
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was found guilty of aiding and abetting in misapplication of the funds
and her conviction was affirmed in United States v. Velasco.71 Her
defense at trial was insanity; and expert testimony was presented at
trial on her behalf which rebutted the presumption of sanity. The is-
sue on appeal was whether the Government then met its burden of go-
ing forward with its evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant was sane and capable of forming the requisite intent.
Two expert witnesses for the Government testified that a person such
as defendant could distinguish between right and wrong and conform
her conduct to the requirements of the law. Taking the evidence in
the aspect most favorable to the Government, the Court of Appeals
held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's mo-
tions for acquittal.
ENTRAPMENT
In United States v. McGrath,80 defendant was convicted of unlawful
possession of counterfeit bills and of conspiracy to produce and pass
counterfeit obligations. The conspiracy count was affirmed but the sub-
stantive offense of unlawful possession was reversed. Secret Service
agents infiltrated defendant's conspiracy and not only arranged for and
supervised the printing of the counterfeit bills, but also determined how
and when they would be delivered to defendant. The Court of Appeals
held that this constituted entrapment as a matter of law. The Court
noted that where a complicated criminal scheme is involved (as in this
counterfeiting case), defendant must have done more than merely set
the scheme in motion in order to justify police solicitation of the kind
here.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
In United States v. Masko,8 ' defendant's conviction for the sale
of LSD was reversed and remanded. One ground for reversal was
that the prosecutor's closing argument statement, that he knew defend-
ant had made the sale, was reversible error where the evidence con-
sisted of the testimony of a buyer who had pled guilty earlier to the
sale of narcotics, and of the testimony of two officers, neither of
whom witnessed the sale by defendant to the buyer.
In United States v. Maenza, 2 the prosecutor misstated a fact in the
79. 471 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1972).
80. 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
81. 473 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1973).
82. 475 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1973).
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closing argument. The Court of Appeals held that this was not rever-
sible error where the misstatement did not affect the central issue in
the prosecution, defense counsel strenuously objected to the statement
before the jury, and the judge supported defense counsel's objections
by saying he did not recall such testimony and that he relied on the
jury to remember what had actually been said.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In United States v. Smith,88 defendant's conviction for making an
obscene or indecent or profane radio communication was reversed and
remanded. The Court of Appeals held that scienter was a necessary
element for conviction and that the district court judge committed
reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury as to that element.
Defendant's attempted bank robbery conviction was affirmed in
United States v. Malasanos.4 The Court of Appeals held that it was
not reversible error to give an instruction on impeachment by prior
conviction where the testimony of defendant in question was part of
his direct testimony, and the instruction merely reflected on his cred-
ibility. It was also not improper to give the jury an instruction that, in
weighing defendant's testimony, the jury should consider that defend-
ant had a vital interest in the outcome of the trial. See also United
States v. Crovedi.8 5
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the narcotic sales
conviction in United States v. Wasko,88 holding that refusal to give an
accomplice instruction was reversible error where the accomplice wit-
ness had participated in the criminal activity and had the same mo-
tive of currying favor with police as if he had been a principal. And
inasmuch as much of the witness's testimony was uncorroborated, the
district court's refusal to give the jury a cautionary instruction on the
weight to be given an accomplice's testimony was reversible error.
In United States v. Ditata, 7 defendant was convicted of pos-
sessing stock certificates stolen from interstate commerce. The dis-
trict judge gave an instruction on the value as "in excess of $100"
as charged in the indictment and submitted the question of value of
the stock certificates to the jury in the form of a special verdict. On
83. 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972).
84. 472 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1973).
85. 467 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 1972).
86. 473 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1973).
87. 469 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1972).
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appeal defendant contended that giving the instruction as to value
was reversible error. The Court of Appeals pointed out that while
the value of each stock certificate in blank form when stolen was only
about nine cents, defendant was indicted for and convicted of the pos-
session, not the theft, of the certificates. The time of theft is thus not
controlling in determining the value of the property as to defendant,
and the Court therefore held that the instruction was not erroneous.
The Court also rejected the claims of the defendant on appeal in
United States v. Bambulas,a8 with respect to instructions. First, de-
fendant claimed that the instruction regarding promise of immunity to
the Government's witnesses was not explicit or substantial. The
Court noted that there was no indication that immunity or leniency
promises had been offered by Government authorities. Second, de-
fendant argued that the judge did not use an instruction detailing im-
peachment of the Government witnesses by previous felony convic-
tions. The Court held that, from their trial testimony, the fact that
the Government witnesses had been previously convicted as felons was
already known to the jury and therefore the trial court's general in-
struction on credibility of witnesses was sufficient.
Defendant in United States v. Grizaffi,s9 assigned error with re-
spect to several jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held no
error was shown in the district court's refusal to give a missing Govern-
ment witness instruction where there was no showing the witness was
within the control of the Government. It was not error to refuse to
give defendant's instruction that the jury must find defendant not
guilty if they found he was unaware of the actual method of recording
transactions in the books of the bank whose funds he conspired to
misapply; proof of knowledge of the method of making accounting en-
tries was not required for conviction. Failure to give an instruction
concerning the weight to be given to the testimony of an expert wit-
ness was not error where the witness in question was not presented as
an expert. Defendant also objected to the giving of an instruction that
included the language, "No person can intentionally avoid knowledge
by closing his eyes to facts which prompt him to investigate." Defend-
ant claimed the instruction is allowable only when qualified with in-
structions informing the jury that guilt cannot be based on negligence.
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, as the instruction specif-
ically states knowledge cannot be intentionally avoided.
88. 471 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1972).
89. 471 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1972).
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JURY DELIBERATION
In United States v. Marlin,9" the Court affirmed the rule that per-
mitting the jury to deliberate in the early hours of the morning was a
matter within the discretion of the trial court. In United States v.
Bambulas,9 1 defendant asserted that the trial judge's instruction as to
further deliberation, given on the judge's own motion after the jury
had deliberated nearly six hours, was improperly given. The Court of
Appeals found no error where the language of the instruction was non-
prejudicial and where the fact that the jury resumed deliberations for
an additional four hours indicated lack of coercion.
GUILTY PLEA
In United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Illinois,9 the Court
ruled that a defendant who pleaded guilty in a state court to charges
of murder, rape on two occasions, and attempted rape, was properly
and sufficiently admonished of the possible consequences of his plea
when he was advised prior to his plea that he was subject to the death
penalty or to imprisonment for "any number of years"; and the
court's failure to explain to him the difference between concurrent and
consecutive sentencing did not deprive him of due process of law.
The Court of Appeals noted that there is nothing to compel the
states to utilize all of the procedures required by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 prescribing the procedure for acceptance of
guilty pleas.
SENTENCING
Imposition of sentences is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court. United States v. Marlin.9" Discretion is not unlimited, how-
ever; a defendant is at least entitled to have the trial judge consider his
application for probation. But in United States v. Hayward,94 the
Court of Appeals ruled that refusal to grant probation to defendant
was not an abuse of discretion where defendant declined to co-op-
erate with the Government in apprehending other offenders.
In United States v. Lopez,95 the Court ruled that where a narcot-
ics offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years at
the time defendant was tried for that offense, and the sentence could
90. 471 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1972).
91. 471 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1972).
92. 473 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1973).
93. 471 F.2d 764, 766-767 (7th Cir. 1972).
94. 471 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1972).
95. 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1973).
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not be suspended nor probation granted, the Court would not remand
the matter to the district court to determine whether the sentence
should be suspended and defendant placed on probation.
In United States v. Solomon,9" defendant sought reduction of his
sentence for several convictions. The Court of Appeals held that
where the original sentence was internally contradictory, the sentence
was illegal and the district court had the power to correct the sentence.
In Caifano v. United States,97 defendant was under a California
district court sentence. After an appeal from a conviction in an
Illinois district court, he was resentenced to two years, the sentence
to run consecutive to the California sentence. The Court of Appeals
held that where the resentencing judgment order did not reflect refer-
ence to credit for time served on the original Illinois sentence and
at that time was in excess of two years, defendant was not required
to serve further time on the Illinois conviction.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In Wheeler v. Glass,8 two mentally retarded youths in a state
institution brought a class action seeking declaratory, injunctive and
pecuniary relief for alleged violations of their rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint alleged that defendants,
by binding plaintiffs to their beds in a public area for over 77 hours
and by forcing them to scrub walls for over ten consecutive hours, sub-
jected plaintiffs to cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Ap-
peals held that plaintiffs' allegations, if proved, stated punishment
which is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
PROBATION REVOCATION
In United States v. Martin,99 defendant was placed on six
months' probation after his plea of guilty to making a false statement in
his passport application. Probation was conditioned on defendant
leaving the country within 60 days of the order. Defendant did
leave the country, but returned shortly thereafter. His probation was
revoked and a sentence was imposed. On appeal the Court held that
where the probation order was ambiguous as to whether defendant was
96. 468 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1972).
97. 471 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972).
98. 473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
99. 467 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1972).
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required to remain out of the country for the entire six-month period
of probation, the sentencing for violation of the order could not stand.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In United States v. Kwitek,1°° a mistrial was declared after de-
fendant's prior criminal record was mistakenly sent into the jury delib-
eration room and it was ascertained that the jury considered the docu-
ment in their deliberations. The Court of Appeals held that the
first trial became nugatory and without legal effect, and defendant's
second and third trials were not barred by the double jeopardy clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Defendant argued that United States v.
Jorn'0 ' dictated that prosecutions subsequent to the first trial were
barred; but the Court of Appeals rejected the application of Jorn
here where the district judge carefully ascertained that the jury did in
fact know the content of the document inadvertently sent to them.
In United States v. McCreery,102 an indictment charging defend-
ant with failure to report for induction was dismissed when the Gov-
ernment was unable to produce records it had been ordered to produce
because the records had been destroyed according to then existing
Selective Service regulations. The order of dismissal in this case
was a ruling on the merits of the defense and thus in the nature of an
acquittal. The Court of Appeals held that jeopardy thus attached
and the Government could not appeal from such an order.
HABEAS CORPUS
In United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois,103 the Court of Appeals
held that where a defendant was tried in a state court and his pri-
vately retained attorney did not move prior to or during trial to sup-
press certain evidence, did not object to admission of the evidence,
and did not raise admission of the evidence as error on direct appeal
in state courts, defendant waived any right to object to admission of
the evidence on petition for habeas corpus. And a federal habeas cor-
pus proceeding is not the proper place for review of a state conviction
on grounds of sufficiency of the evidence, unless the conviction is so
devoid of evidentiary support as to raise an issue of due process.
100. 467 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1972).
101. 400 U.S. 470 (1971). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
missal of a second prosecution under the theory that, following a mistrial declared
sua sponte by the trial judge without defendant's consent and not solely in defendant's
interest, re-prosecution of that defendant would violate the Fifth Amendment's double
jeopardy proscription.
102. 473 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1973).
103. 469 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1972).
